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Abstract
To study whether foreign aid fuels personal, regional and ethnic favoritism, we
use satellite data on nighttime light for any region in any aid-recipient country,
and we determine for each year and each country the region in which the current
political leader was born. Having a panel with 22,850 regions in 91 aid recipient
countries with yearly observations from 1992 to 2005, we compare the eect of
foreign aid on nighttime light across regions. We nd that in countries with poor
political institutions, this eect is signicantly higher in the region in which the
current political leader was born than in other regions. This nding suggests that
a disproportionate share of foreign aid ends up in the leader's birth region, and we
argue that it supports the view that foreign aid fuels favoritism, broadly dened. We
nd no such dierence in aid-recipient countries with sound political institutions.
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11 Introduction
Back in the 1960s and 1970s most development economists and donor agencies were opti-
mistic about the potential of foreign aid to foster development in aid recipient countries.
One of the rst aid pessimists was Peter Bauer. He was concerned that \[b]ecause aid
accrues to the government it increases its resources, patronage, and power" (Bauer, 1991,
p. 45). In particular, political leaders may engage in various forms of favoritism when
allocating foreign aid. They could favor themselves and their family and friends, or the
region from which they are coming, or members of the ethnic group to which they belong.
So far, however, the question whether foreign aid does systematically fuel such personal,
regional and ethnic favoritism remains unanswered. The only existing empirical studies
that could potentially help us answering this question are those on the eect of foreign
aid on perceived corruption and governance, but their results are mixed.1;2
We propose to study whether foreign aid fuels favoritism, broadly dened, by looking
whether a disproportionate share of foreign aid ends up in the political leader's birth
region. We therefore combine dierent data sources in a novel way: they include satellite
data on nighttime light, and information on the birth places of political leaders. Weather
satellites record the intensity of nighttime light. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) provides a measure of nighttime light for each year from 1992 to
2005 based on evening readings during the dark half of the lunar cycle in seasons when
the sun sets early. Nighttime light has been proposed as a measure of economic activ-
ity by Sutton and Costanza (2002), Doll et al. (2006), Sutton et al. (2007), and { most
forcefully { by Henderson et al. (2009). Like GDP, nighttime light is likely to reect some
private consumption, some production and some government expenditures. But GDP and
other data collected by governments of poor aid recipient countries are often considered
1Svensson (2000) shows that foreign aid is associated with higher corruption in ethnically fractionalized
countries. Knack (2001) nds that foreign aid tends to lower the quality of governance, but not to raise
corruption. Alesina and Weder (2002) nd a positive association between changes in aid and corruption,
but Tavares (2003) nds that foreign aid tends to lower corruption.
2Bjrnskov (2010) nds a positive eect of foreign aid on the income share of the upper quintile, which
could be interpreted as evidence that foreign aid leads to some form of favoritism. But surprisingly, this
eect turns out to be stronger in relatively democratic countries than in undemocratic countries.
2to be of low quality, partly because governments lack data collection capability.3 Chen
and Nordhaus (2010) point out that nighttime light data is a useful measure of economic
activity for countries with poor statistical systems. Also in the presence of weak insti-
tutions and the associated low pressures of accountability, governments may deliberately
manipulate ocial statistics, e.g., to cover up corrupt activities. While it is hard to trust
country level GDP data of poor aid recipient countries, data on regional GDP is often
not even available. Unlike GDP data, nighttime light data is available in the same high
quality for any region in any aid-recipient country, making it \uniquely suited to spatial
analyses of economic activity" (Henderson et al., 2009, p. 4). As a measure of regional
economic activity, we therefore construct nighttime light per capita for any region in
any aid-recipient country for which geographical information about regional boarders and
regional population data is available.
Goemans et al. (2009) have compiled a data base of eective political leaders. We
add the birth places of the political leaders who were in power from 1991 onwards. For
each year and each aid-recipient country, we label the region in which the current political
leader was born the leader region. In addition to regional nighttime light per capita and
leader region dummies, we use standard variables for foreign aid and political institutions
(i.e., ODA per capita and Polity2) to construct a panel with 22,850 regions in 91 aid-
recipient countries with yearly observations from 1992 to 2005.
Using region and year xed eects, and a set of control variables, we nd that in
countries with poor political institutions, the eect of foreign aid on nighttime light is
signicantly higher in leader regions than in other regions. This nding suggests that a
disproportionate share of foreign aid ends up in leader regions, and it is consistent with the
view that foreign aid fuels favoritism in weakly institutionalized countries.4 Interestingly,
for aid-recipient countries with sound political institutions we nd no evidence that foreign
3For example, there was only one qualied accountant in Burundi's entire public sector in 1990
(Br autigam and Knack, 2004).
4It is irrelevant for our argument whether foreign aid is directly channeled to the leader region, or
whether more other public revenues are channeled to the leader region when foreign aid increases.
3aid has a dierent eect on nighttime light in leader regions than in other regions. This
latter nding is consistent with the view that democratic institutions reduce aid-fueled
favoritism.
Before elaborating in more detail on possible and plausible interpretations of our
ndings, it is helpful to take a closer look at some country examples. Mobutu Sese Seko
was dictator of Zaire (today's Democratic Republic of the Congo) from 1965 to 1997. He
was a true kleptomaniac. Besides expropriating investors and plundering the central bank,
he relied on \the massive diversion of foreign loans and aid" (Edgerton, 2002, p. 211).
In the 1980s Mobutu's estimated fortune was $5 billion. He had money on Swiss bank
accounts, and properties in Abidjan, Brussels, Cape Town, Dakar, Madrid, Marrakech,
Paris, on the French Riveria, as well as in Brazil, Portugal and Switzerland (Edgerton,
2002; Meredith, 2005). However, he most lavishly spent money in Gbadolite, a small town
in Equateur in remote northeastern Zaire. Gbadolite was Mobutu ancestral home and
near his birth place. There he built a huge palace complex costing $100 million, as well
as luxury guesthouses and hotels, a replica of a Chinese pagoda, and \an airport capable
of handling supersonic Concordes which Mobutu often chartered for his trips abroad"
(Meredith, 2005, p. 299; Edgerton, 2002). In addition, he gave Gbadolite \the country's
best supply of water and electricity, not to mention television stations, telephones, and
medical services" (Edgerton, 2002, p. 211). In his time in Gbadolite, Mobutu and his clan
spent his riches in grand style on average days, and without any restraint whatsoever on
ceremonies like his daughter's wedding (Edgerton, 2002). The second tier of government
ocials also came \primarily from Equateur" (Leslie, 1993, p. 72), and they also engaged
in massive corruption.
There is also casual evidence that a disproportionate share of foreign aid may end up
in the leader region in Zambia, Kenya and Bolivia. Posner (2005) nicely documents that
in Zambia presidents are \expected to channel donor aid or relief food to their regions"
(p. 96), and that \the President is also widely assumed to favor members of his own
ethnic group when it comes to making governmental appointments" (p. 97). In Kenya,
4both the Kalenjin dominated government around Daniel arap Moi, who was president
from 1978 to 2002, and the Kikuyu dominated government around Mwai Kibaki, who
has been president ever since, engaged in ethnic and regional favoritism, and extracted
foreign aid and other public funds on a large scale (Wrong, 2009). In Bolivia, Evo Morales
is the rst indigenous president and also the rst president from a rural district in the
highlands, and he uses foreign aid and natural resource revenues accruing in the lowlands
to support the poor indigenous population in the highlands.5
These examples suggest various reasons why a high share of foreign aid may end up
in the leader region: First, political leaders may simply embezzle aid inows and spend
them in their region, possibly together with their family and clan members. Second, they
may channel aid inows towards their region because of regional or ethnic favoritism, or
to secure support in their stronghold, or to compensate for past underfunding of their
region. Third, they may appoint government ocials from their region, and these ocials
may also embezzle aid and favor their region.
Furthermore, these country examples suggest that we may underestimate aid-fueled
favoritism, among others, because some political leaders favor a multitude of regions when
allocating aid, and because some foreign aid is channeled onto overseas bank accounts.
As a consequence, our nding of aid-fueled favoritism in countries with poor political
institutions is even more remarkable. But, on the other hand, we need to be cautious when
interpreting our ndings for countries with sound political institutions. These ndings
are consistent with our preferred view that sound political institutions reduce aid-fueled
favoritism, but also with the view that sound political institutions lead to dierent forms
of aid-fueled favoritism, which are just not observable from outer space.
Our ndings are well in line with the predictions of some recent theoretical models:
The model of Besley and Persson (2010) predicts that foreign aid leads to higher public
goods provision if state capacity is high, but to transfers to the group in power if state
5See, e.g., New York Times, U.S. Aid Can't Win Bolivia's Love as New Suitors Emerge, May 14, 2006;
and New York Times, A Crisis Highlights Divisions in Bolivia, September 15, 2008.
5capacity is low. Similarly, the model of Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) suggests that
political leaders embezzle natural resource rents and foreign aid inows, for that matter,
if and only if political institutions are suciently weak. The nding of a disproportionate
share of foreign aid ending up in the leader region is also consistent with the models of
foreign aid and rent seeking by Svensson (2000) and Hodler (2007).
Our paper contributes to the recent literature on the role of political leaders for eco-
nomic outcomes. Jones and Olken (2005) nd that political leaders matter for economic
growth, and more so in autocratic than in democratic countries. Similarly our ndings
suggest that political leaders matter more for the allocation of public funds in autocratic
than in democratic countries. A likely driving force of both these results is that autocratic
leaders face few constraints and can choose more or less any policy they like, while checks
and balances prevent democratic leaders from choosing some socially very harmful poli-
cies. Our paper is also related to Kasara (2007), Kudamatsu (2009), Franck and Rainer
(2009), and Burgess et al. (2010), who all study whether and how the political leader's
ethnicity aects policy outcomes across ethnic groups in Sub-Saharan African countries.6
As our approach of measuring favoritism also captures personal favoritism, i.e., corrup-
tion, our paper is further related to Reinikka and Svensson (2004), Hsieh and Moretti
(2006), Olken and Barron (2009), and Bertrand et al. (2007), who all study corruption
using innovative measures rather than standard perception-based measures of corruption.7
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In sections 2 and 3 we present our
data and our empirical strategy. In section 4 we present our main ndings, and we show
that they are robust to the use of alternative samples, alternative measures of foreign aid
and political institutions, alternative subnational units, additional control variables, and
an instrumental variables approach to address the potential endogeneity of foreign aid.
We also address the potential endogeneity of leader regions. We then briey conclude in
6More generally, our paper relates to the literature on the negative economic consequences of ethnic
divisions. There is evidence that ethnic divisions lead to corruption, poor governance (La Porta et al.,
1999; Alesina et al., 2003) and low public good provision (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), thereby lowering
economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Easterly and Levine, 1997).
7Olken (2009) discusses the limitations of relying on perception-based measures of corruption.
6section 5.
2 Data
Satellite data on nighttime light reections stems from NOAA (2009).8 Weather satellites
from the US Air Force circle the earth 14 times per day and measure light intensity
everywhere on earth between 65 degrees North and 65 degrees South every night somewhen
between 8.30 and 10.00pm. To get primarily man-made nighttime light, only readings from
the dark half of the lunar cycle in seasons when the sun sets early is used, and readings
aected by northern or southern lights, forest res and cloud cover are removed. The
original nighttime light readings are then recalibrated to account for variations in sensor
settings over time. The recalibrated data is available on a scale from 0 to 63, with higher
values implying higher light intensity. This data is available for the time period from 1992
to 2005 for output pixels that correspond to approximately one square kilometer.
Nighttime light data is a proxy for economic activities, as most forms of consumption
and production in the evening require light. Also public infrastructure is often lit at night.
It is therefore not surprising that Henderson et al. (2009) nd a high correlation between
changes in nighttime light and GDP over time. Compared to GDP data, nighttime light
data has two main advantages as measure of economic activity: First it is available in the
same high quality for all countries that are not too close to either of the two poles, while
GDP data is often of poor quality or even unavailable for developing countries.9
Second it is available at the regional and local level, which is very useful for our
purpose. The example of Mobutu's ancestral town of Gbadolite nicely illustrates how
well nighttime light data can capture changes in economic activity at the local level.
Figure 1 shows nighttime light in Gbadolite for various years. Nighttime light was rather
intense in the period until 1996. Then in 1997 Laurent-D esir e Kabila and his rebel groups
8See Henderson et al. (2009) for a more detailed description of nighttime light data, as well as for an
excellent discussion of its advantages and the various weaknesses of GDP data.
9Nighttime light data is available for all countries that received aid in the period from 1992 to 2005
except Russia, as parts of Russia are above 65 degrees North.
7seized power in the Congo and political rents stopped oating into town. As a result
nighttime light intensity dropped considerably.
Our dependent variable is the log of nighttime light per capita in region i in country
c in year t, Lightict. It is constructed in three steps: First, we use raw satellite images
on average nighttime light reections per annum obtained from NOAA. Figure 2, panel
(a) provides an illustrative example of nighttime light in India in 2003. Because pixel size
varies by latitude we project the original satellite image on a surface using the Eckert IV
projection in order to preserve an equal area. Second, we apply another GIS-shapele that
contains information on subnational administrative units and their boundaries (CIESIN,
2005). For most countries, regional administrative boundaries are available at two dierent
federal levels. We choose the lowest federal level available for each country. Figure 2,
panel (b) shows these boundaries for India. For each subnational region i, we calculate
the sum of all nighttime light pixel values within each subnational region. Third, in order
to adjust the sum of nightime light per subnational region for population size, we use a
third set of GIS-shapeles that contain information of the population distribution around
the world. The global population grid project (CIESIN, 2005) collected basic population
numbers from national census data worldwide and combined it with the spatial boundary
information on subnational administrative units. The published population data has then
been disaggregated and assigned to equally sized grid cells within each subnational unit.
Figure 3, panel (a) shows the distribution of population in India in 2000. For our analysis
we convert this disaggregated population information back to the total population by
administrative unit. As subnational population data is available only for the years 1990,
1995, 2000 and 2005, all missing years are replaced by a linear interpolation of subnational
population on years. Once again we take the sum of all population pixel values within
each subnational region (see gure 3, panel (b)), and we use it to derive nighttime light per
1,000 inhabitants. Finally, taking the logarithm gives us our dependent variable Lightict.
The data base of Goemans et al. (2009) identies the eective political leader of each
country for many years up to 2004. It contains information about the exact time period
8in which a particular individual is a country's political leader. We add to this data base
the birthplace of all political leaders in aid-recipient countries within the time period from
1991 onwards. We collect this information using resources cited in Goemans et al. (2009)
as well as various internet sites. We map the political leaders' birthplaces with subnational
regions via GIS using shapeles with longitude and latitude information on settlement
points (CIESIN, 2005) if possible, and latitude and longitude of birthplaces otherwise.
We thereby exclude leaders who were born abroad as well as leaders for whom we could
not nd birthplace information.10 We call the region in which the current political leader
was born the leader region, and we construct the dummy variable Leaderict that is equal
to one if region i was a leader region of country c in year t, and equal to zero otherwise.
We use standard measures for foreign aid and political institutions. Our main aid
measure, Aidct, is based on ocial development assistance (ODA) data from the OECD
(2008), and dened as the log of net ODA in current US dollars per capita. Our main
institutional variable, Polityct, is based on the Polity IV database by Marshall and Jaggers
(2005). Polityct is the dierence between the democracy and the autocracy indicators,
rescaled such that it ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values implying better political
institutions. It measures the competitiveness and regulation of political participation,
the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the constraints on the
executive. Note that Aidct and Polityct are available at the country level only. Combining
our four main variables Lightict, Leaderict, Aidct and Polityct, we get an unbalanced panel
of 22,850 regions in 91 aid-recipient countries with annual observations for the years 1992
to 2005. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these four variables. In addition, we
use various control variables.11
10All leaders for whom we could not nd birthplace information were in power for less than 50 days.
11Appendix A provides a list of the 91 countries in our sample, and Appendix B a brief description of
all variables used in our analysis.
93 Empirical Strategy
The objective of our empirical analysis is to test whether and how the eect of foreign
aid on nighttime light is dierent in leader regions than in other regions, and how this
dierence depends on the quality of political institutions. For that purpose we estimate
the following equation:
Lightict = i + t + 1Leaderict 1 + 2Aidct 1 + 3Polityct 1 + 4(Leaderict 1  Aidct 1)





In what follows we briey discuss the various terms of this equation. The regional
dummy variable i indicates the use of region xed eects. Region xed eects are
important to overcome the omitted variable bias that might otherwise arise because the
regions' nighttime light and their likelihood of being a leader region could both depend on
some unobservable region-specic characteristics. The year dummy variable t controls
for time varying common shocks and changes in satellites and their sensor settings.
We use lagged values of our three main explanatory variables { Aidct, Polityct and
Leaderict { because the process from aid disbursements to changes in observed nighttime
light intensity takes time. This delay follows from the time lags between the arrival of
aid payments to the point in time when the central government decides on the alloca-
tion of aid (and other public funds); between the government's allocation decision and
the arrival of transfers in the chosen regions; and also between the arrival of transfers in
these regions and the increase in recorded nighttime light via investment (e.g. construc-
tion of houses or plants), private consumption (e.g. electronic devices), or government
expenditures (e.g. lamp posts). Also note that ODA data documents the sum of all aid
disbursements in country c over the entire year t; and that it is especially unlikely that
aid payments received late in the year could translate into nighttime light in the same
year. In addition, the use of lagged values of our main explanatory variables may help to
reduce any potential simultaneity bias.
10Vector Xict contains control variables that may either aect the \production" of night-
time light, or its observability from outer space. These control variables are regional pop-
ulation (Populationict), oil and coal production (Oilct, Coalct), the numbers of natural
disasters and revolutions (Disastersct, Revolutionsct), and a standard measure of the
quality of government (Governancect). Note that all of these control variables, except
Populationict, are at the country level. We refrain from using economic control variables
from ocial government statistics in our main specication, but we will add such control
variables in one of our robustness exercises.
Vector Zict 1 contains the interaction terms Aidct 1  Polityct 1 and Leaderict 1 
Polityct 1. We need to control for these two additional interaction terms to ensure that a
signicant coecient 5 really implies signicance of Leaderict 1Aidct 1Polityct 1, and
cannot just be a statistical artefact because Aidct 1Polityct 1 or Leaderict 1Polityct 1
is signicant, but uncontrolled for.
The dierence between the eect of Aidct 1 on Lightict in leader regions and other
regions is 4 + 5Polityct 1. We are therefore primarily interested in the coecients 4
and 5. We expect 4 to be positive and 5 to be negative. A positive and statistically
signicant coecient 4 implies that in countries with poor political institutions the eect
of Aidct 1 on Lightict is higher in leader regions than elsewhere. A negative and statis-
tically signicant coecient 5 implies that the dierence between the eects of Aidct 1
on Lightict in leader regions and other regions becomes smaller as political institutions
improve. Based on 4 +5, we can further check whether the eect of Aidct 1 on Lightict
is dierent in leader regions than elsewhere when political institutions are excellent.
Following our discussion in the introduction, and keeping the broad denition of fa-
voritism in mind, we will interpret 4 > 0 as evidence that foreign aid fuels favoritism,
and 5 < 0 as evidence that sound political institutions reduce aid-fueled favoritism.
114 Main Findings and Robustness Tests
Table 2 presents our main results. In column 1 we include our three main explanatory
variables, Leaderict 1, Aidct 1 and Polityct 1, but without any interaction terms. As in
all other regressions, region and year xed eects are included, and standard errors are
adjusted for county-year clustering. We nd that Leaderict 1 has a positive eect on
Lightict, while Aidct 1 has a negative eect. In column 2 we add the interaction term
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1, which turns out to be insignicant, suggesting that the eect of
Aidct 1 on Lightict is on average not signicantly dierent in leader regions than in other
regions. In column 3 we also add the interaction term Leaderict 1 Aidct 1 Polityct 1.
We nd that the coecient on Leaderict 1  Aidct 1, 4, is signicantly positive, while
the coecient on Leaderict 1  Aidct 1  Polityct 1, 5, is signicantly negative. In
columns 4 and 5 we add interaction terms Zict 1 and control variables Xict. We see
that coecient 4 remains signicantly positive, and coecient 5 signicantly negative.
Further the coecient of Aidct 1 is signicantly negative, suggesting a negative eect of
Aidct 1 on Lightict when Leaderict 1 = 0 and Polityct 1 = 0.12 Regional population has a
negative eect on nighttime light per capita, which suggests that an increase in population
translates into a comparatively smaller increase in recorded nighttime light. Also we note
that Governancect tends to have a positive eect on Lightict, while Polityct 1 tends to
have a negative eect.
Figure 5 illustrates the results from our baseline specication (column 5). It shows the
eect of Leaderict 1  Aidct 1 on Lightict, which is 4 + 5Polityct 1, and how this eect
changes in Polityct 1. We can see that this eect is signicantly positive for low levels
of Polityct 1, which implies that the eect of Aidct 1 on Lightict is signicantly higher in
leader regions than in other regions of countries with poor political institutions. Due to
our log specication, we can interpret the coecients as elasticities. Hence, when Aidct 1
increases by 100 percent, the dierence between Lightict in the leader region and in other
regions increases by almost 10 percent in countries with very poor political institutions.
12The subsequent robustness exercises show that this negative eect is not robust.
12However, the eect of Leaderict 1Aidct 1 on Lightict decreases in Polityct 1 and is close
to zero for Polityct 1 close to one. That is, in countries with suciently strong political
institutions we cannot observe any dierence between the eect of Aidct 1 on Lightict
in leader regions and other regions. This latter result follows because better political
institutions lower the eect of Aidct 1 on Lightict in the leader region, and also because
they raise the eect of Aidct 1 on Lightict in other regions. As argued in the introduction,
these ndings are consistent with the view that foreign aid fuels favoritisms in countries
with poor political institutions, and that sound political institutions reduce aid-fueled
favoritism.
We now present various robustness exercises. A rst concern could be that our results
are driven by countries from a particular region of the world. For example, they might
be driven by the ethnically highly fractionalized countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, or by
the mostly Muslim countries with their mostly authoritarian regimes in the Middle East
and Northern Africa, or by the formerly communist states in Eastern Europe and Central
Asia. In columns 1-6 of table 3 we therefore exclude one region of the world at a time
from our sample.13 We nd in all instances that Leaderct 1Aidct 1 remains signicantly
positive, and that Leaderict 1  Aidct 1  Polityct 1 remains negative and signicant at
least at the 10% level. In column 7 we nd that these interaction terms remain highly
signicant when excluding member countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). Hence our main results do not strongly depend on the countries from
any particular region of the world, or the major oil producers and exporters.14
In table 4 we look at various other sub-samples. It is sometimes suggested that the
poorest countries, or the \bottom billion" as Collier (2007) calls them, are fundamentally
dierent than better performing developing countries. In columns 1 and 2 we therefore
present the results separately for the least developed countries (LDCs) and the other aid
13The world regions are East Asia and Pacic (EAP), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin
America and the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA), and
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
14Our main results are also robust when we exclude countries colonized by the British, France and
Spain, respectively (results available on request).
13recipient countries. The results are similar but the coecients of interest are higher for the
LDCs. Hence, it could be the case that aid-fueled favoritism is somewhat more pronounced
in LDCs, but sound political institutions seem to be no less useful in preventing favoritism
in LDCs than elsewhere.
One form of favoritism that our approach might capture is ethnic favoritism, which
might be more prevalent in ethnically fractionalized than in homogenous countries (even
though our results hold when excluding Sub-Saharan Africa). In columns 3 and 4 of table
4 we therefore split the sample into countries in which ethnolinguistic fractionalization
(ELF) is lower than in the median country of our sample, and countries in which ELF is
above the median. Again the general pattern is the same in both sub samples. It however
seems that sound political institutions might be somewhat less successful in preventing
aid-fueled favoritism in fractionalized countries than in more homogenous countries.
As we use region xed eects, it is clear that the coecient estimates of Leaderict 1
and Polityct 1 are exclusively driven by observations from countries in which political
leadership and polity scores, respectively, varied over the sample period. But as Aidct 1
varies over time for all countries in our sample, the coecient estimates of Leaderct 1 
Aidct 1 and Leaderict 1  Aidct 1  Polityct 1 are also inuenced by observations from
the 18 countries in our sample in which the same political leader was in power from 1991
to 2004.15 In addition, the coecient estimate of Leaderict 1  Aidct 1  Polityct 1 is
also inuenced by observations from the 21 countries in our sample in which there was
no change in polity scores from 1991 to 2004.16 To make sure that our main results are
not driven by either of these two sets of countries, we drop the 18 countries without any
change in Leaderict 1 in column 5 of table 4, and the 21 countries without any change
in Polityct 1 in column 6. In both instances our two coecients of interest show the
predicted signs and are highly signicant.
15Most countries without any change in political leadership are autocratic Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries.
16Countries without any change in polity scores are very diverse, ranging from highly autocratic coun-
tries like North Korea to Costa Rica, Slovenia and Uruguay, which all got the highest possible polity
score throughout the sample period.
14In table 5 we show that our results are robust when using alternative measures of aid
inows and nighttime light. When constructing our standard aid variable, we take the
log of ODA per capita. Hence we loose all observations with zero or negative aid inows.
We therefore construct a new aid variable (Aidnn
ct ) by setting negative values of ODA per
capita equal to zero, and then taking the log of these non-negative values plus one. We
use Aidnn
ct in column 1, and the often used aid dependency measure of ODA as a share
of GDP (AidGDP
ct ) in column 2. Based on ODA data, Roodman (2006) constructs an
alternative aid measure, Net Aid Transfers, which, among others, excludes cancelation of
old non-ODA loans. In column 3 we use the log of Net Aid Transfers per capita (AidNAT
ct ).
We nd that the coecients of interest are highly signicant when using Aidnn
ct , and still
signicant at least at the 10% level when using AidGDP
ct or AidNAT
ct .
We argued earlier that the nighttime light data is of excellent quality. However we
can be less certain about the quality of the regional population data, which we also use
to construct our dependent variable Lightict. To ensure that our results are not driven by
some problems with the regional population data, we use the log of nighttime light per
area (Lightarea
ict ) as dependent variable in column 4 of table 5. For the same reason we
replace regional population by country level population in our set of control variables. It
is reassuring that our results are very similar with nighttime light per area (and country
level population as control variable) as they are with nighttime light per capita (and
regional population as control variable).
A multitude of dierent indicators are used in the literature to measure the quality
of political institutions. While Polityct is probably the most widely used of these mea-
sures, table 6 shows that our main results also hold for other commonly used measures of
institutional quality. First, we use the Politydummyct, which is equal to 1 if Polityct is
positive, and equal to 0 if Polityct is negative. Second, we use the number of veto players
(Checksct), which is a often referred to as a measure of checks and balances. Checksct
might a particularly appropriate alternative to Polityct because political leaders can more
easily engage in favoritism when there are fewer veto players that need to be convinced or
15bought o. Third, we use the Freedom House measures of political rights (Rightsct) and
civil liberties (Libertiesct), which we rescale so that they vary from 0 to 1 with higher
values indicating better institutions. Finally we replace Polityct by Governancect. In all
instances we nd that our main results still hold. The interactions of these institutional
variables with Leaderict 1Aidct 1 are signicantly negative, while Leaderict 1Aidct 1
by itself is signicantly positive.
In table 7 we add further control variables. One could be concerned that a dispro-
portionate share of foreign aid may end up in leader regions because quite a few leaders
are born in capital regions, i.e., regions in which capital cities are located, and because a
disproportionate share of foreign aid may end up in capital regions. Reasons for the latter
could be that political leaders and their entourage may spend embezzled foreign aid in the
capital, or that the political power of the capital's population may induce the government
to spend most resources in the capital (Ades and Glaeser, 1995). We therefore control in
all columns of table 7 for the interactions of Aidct 1 and Polityct 1 with a dummy variable
that is equal to one for capital regions (Capitalic). We nd that our main results still
hold. Further we indeed nd evidence that a disproportionate share of foreign aid ends up
in capital regions. Unlike the nding of a disproportionate share of foreign aid ending up
in leader regions, this eect is however independent of the quality of political institutions.
So far, we have refrained from adding economic control variables based on data collected
by recipient country governments. But in column 2 we add government expenditures per
capita (Expendituresct), investment as a share of GDP (Investmentct), and in column 3
we further add the ination rate (Inflationct) and M2ct, which is often used as a measure
of nancial depth. In column 4 we also add country-specic time trends. We nd that
the coecients of interest remain signicant in all instances.
Apart from foreign aid, rents and revenues that accrue to governments from other
sources may also provide political leaders with opportunities to engage in favoritism.
Hence a disproportionate share of other rents and revenues may also end up in leader re-
gions. Moreover, some of these rents and revenues are correlated with foreign aid inows
16which could potentially bias our estimates. In table 8 we therefore use log government ex-
penditures per capita (Expendituresict 1) and log resource rents per capita (RRict 1), as
well as their interactions with Leaderict 1 and Polityict 1. In column 1 we replace Aidct 1
by Expendituresct 1 in our main specication. We nd that government expenditures
have an overall positive eect on Lightict, but that the eect is not signicantly dierent
in leader regions than elsewhere. In column 2 we use both Aidct 1 and Expendituresct 1,
as well as the respective interaction terms. We nd that our coecients of interest still
show the predicted signs. In columns 3 and 4 we present similar regressions using resource
rents RRct 1 rather than government expenditures. Again we nd that resource rents in-
crease Lightict in general, but that there is no signicant dierence between the eect in
leader regions and elsewhere. Also our main results still hold. In column 5 we include all
three sources of rents and revenues, and their respective interaction terms. We again nd
that favoritism in the political leaders' birth regions is mainly fueled by foreign aid.17
Foreign aid may well be endogenous to economic activity at the country level and,
therefore, to aggregate country-wide nighttime light. Regional nighttime light aects ag-
gregate country-wide nighttime light by construction. We might therefore be concerned
about the endogeneity of foreign aid in our specication. These endogeneity concerns
however should not be too serious. First, because an average country in our sample con-
sists of 251 regions, such that most regions have an almost negligible eect on aggregate
country-wide nighttime light. Second, because we use lagged values of foreign aid. Nev-
17There are at least two possible explanations why we may nd no evidence that disproportionate
shares of government expenditures and resource rents end up in leader regions, not even in countries with
weak political institutions where a disproportionate share of foreign aid ends up in leader regions. The
rst explanation has to do with the visibility of resources and rents. People paying taxes and observing
mines and oil elds may hold their government accountable and may want to know what happens to
these revenues and rents. However they do not observe aid inows and nd it therefore harder to keep
their government accountable for its aid allocation. The second explanation has to do with the quality
of the data. Aid data is of high quality, while data on government expenditures does typically not
include embezzled public funds; and the World Bank's (2009) adjusted net savings data has many gaps
for rents from various types of resources in various countries. We partly address this latter problem
by excluding countries for which only data on rents from forestry is available. However we still have
numerous countries with gaps for rents from particular sources of energy and minerals. Hence it could be
that disproportionate shares of government expenditures and resource rents do actually end up in leader
regions, but that the quality of the available data is just not good enough to reveal that pattern.
17ertheless we check whether our results are robust to the use of an instrumental variables
approach. Most instruments suggested in the literature are of cross sectional nature (e.g.,
Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). In our setting, however, the region xed eects control
for all time-invariant determinants of aid, while the timing of aid inows can potentially
be endogenous. So we need an instrument that captures exogenous variation in aid in-
ows over time. We use the instrument proposed by Harding and Venables (2010). Their
instrument is based on bilateral foreign aid ows from 22 donors to all the recipient coun-
tries, and given by Act =
P22
d=1 (scdadt), where scd is the average annual share of bilateral
aid that donor d has given to recipient country c over the period 1960-2008, and adt is
total bilateral aid from donor d to all recipient countries in year t. The idea behind this
instrument is that the time-variation in adt is driven by the overall aid budget of donor
d, which is likely to be determined by national budget considerations and other donor
characteristics rather than the economic or political situation in a particular recipient
country. The share scd is a long-run historical average and should be exogenous.
In table 9, we present two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates using the log of Act 1
per capita (AidHV
ct 1) and its interactions with Leaderict 1 and Polityct 1 and Leaderict 1
Polityct 1 as instruments for Aidct 1 and its interactions with Leaderict 1, Polityct 1 and
Leaderict 1  Polityct 1. In columns 1 and 2 we reestimate columns 4 and 5 of table 2
using 2SLS (where the latter is our main specication). In columns 3 and 4 we further
add the additional control variables and the country-specic time trends used in table
7. In all instances the F-statistics of the rst stage regressions exceed the threshold
value of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) to uncover weak instruments. Also
the Andersson-Rubin test rejects the null of underidentication in all four specications.
We note that the coecients of interest remain highly signicant and become somewhat
larger in magnitude compared to our OLS estimates.
In table 10 we look at whether the eect of Aidct 1 on Lightict is dierent in past
and future leader regions than in other regions. In column 1 we look at past leader
regions, i.e., at regions that used to be leader regions until recently. We therefore replace
18Leaderict 1 with the lag of the dummy variable Pastict that is equal to one for regions that
are not leader regions in year t, but were leader regions in t   1. We nd that Pastict 1
itself is insignicant, and that its interactions with Aidct 1 and Aidct 1  Polityct 1 are
insignicant as well (with the coecients even having the \wrong" signs). In columns




ict 1 to distinguish between
the cases in which the former political leaders lost power through regular means (e.g.,
retirement, term limits or electoral defeat), and cases in which they lost power through
irregular means (e.g., coup d' etats or popular revolts). In both cases the coecients
of interest are again insignicant. This absence of signicance has various implications:
First, it implies that the disproportionate share of foreign aid that ows to leader regions
has no noticeable long-run eect on nighttime light. Hence it seems that most aid ending
up in leader regions is used for consumption purposes rather than, say, investments into
infrastructure project. Second, this absence of signicance supports our interpretation of
our main nding. The signicance of Leaderict 1  Aidct 1 and Leaderict 1  Aidct 1 
Polityct 1 suggests that foreign aid has a dierent eect in leader regions than in other
regions, and that this eect depends on the quality of political institutions. Our preferred
interpretation is that this dierence comes from the fact that the current political leaders
were born in the leader regions rather than from some other time variant characteristics
of leader regions. The use of region xed eects already ensures that our results cannot
be driven by some time invariant characteristics of leader regions; and the absence of





suggests that it is the political leaders that matter for aid allocation rather than some
characteristics of the regions they are coming from.
In their study of the eects of political leaders on economic growth, Jones and Olken
(2005) address the potential endogeneity of leadership changes by focusing on cases of
political leaders that died of natural causes or accidents while in power. Similarly in
column 4 we use the dummy variable Pastdeath
ict 1 to focus exclusively on regions of former
political leaders who died of natural causes while in power. Again all coecients of interest
19are insignicant, which further supports our claim that political leaders themselves rather
than some regional characteristics matter for aid allocation.
We now turn to future leader regions. In column 5 we use the dummy variable
Future1
ict that is equal to one for regions that are not yet leader regions in year t,
but will be leader regions in t + 1. We nd that Future1
ict and its interaction with
Aidct 1  Polityct 1 are insignicant, while Future1
ict  Aidct 1 is signicant at the 10%
level. In column 6 we show that all coecients of interest become insignicant when
using the dummy variable Future2
ict that is equal to one for regions that will become
leader regions in year t+2. Hence future leader regions are quite similar to other regions,
which again suggests that it is primarily political leaders themselves that matter for aid
allocation.18
The size of subnational administrative units varies between dierent countries, due
to dierences in size, geography, and rules dening administrative boundaries. To ensure
that our result are not somehow an artefact of these dierently sized regions, we construct
equally sized, articial subnational units around each settlement point. We use GIS-
software to construct settlement areas that cover a circular area with a 10 km radius
around each settlement point (CIESIN, 2005) in any aid-recipient country.19 We take
these settlement areas as our new subnational unit i. As dependent variable we use the
log of nighttime light per area.20 We identify each settlement point that is a leader's
18In column 5 Future1
ict  Aidct 1 is weakly signicant. It may well be that future political leaders
have some limited impact on aid allocation decisions already shortly before becoming the ocial political
leader, e.g., because they already play an important role in their predecessors' government, or because
the predecessors try to buy them or their supporters o. This explanation is consistent with our claim
that foreign aid has a dierent eect on leader regions than other regions because political leaders were
born in the leader regions. Alternatively, some changes in underlying regional characteristics might
make future leader regions slightly better in appropriating foreign aid; and these changes might also
raise the probability that the future political leader comes from these regions. The insignicance of
Future2
ict  Aidct 1 in column 6 suggests, however, that changes in political leadership would need to
follow changes in underlying regional characteristics very quickly, which we think is implausible.
19A more detailed description of the construction of this dataset can be found in Appendix C.
20The gridded population data used to construct our main dependent variable provides a good estimate
of population at subnational level. However, it is questionable whether the spatial interpolation used to
disaggregate these population gures and assign them to grid cells coincides well with our narrowly
dened geographical units in this robustness test. We therefore use nighttime light per area rather than
per capita.
20birthplace either by name or longitude and latitude, and we dene this settlement area as
the leader settlement area. Again, we build interaction terms between Aidct 1, Polityct 1,
and the new leader settlement area dummy variable (Leaderict 1). In table 11 we present
the results when rerunning our main specication and some specications with less or
more control variables with these new settlement area variables. The results show that
our two interaction terms of interest are highly signicant also when using small and
equally sized subnational units. Moreover we nd further support that a disproportionate
share of foreign aid ends up in capital cities.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have compared the eect of foreign aid on nighttime light across sub-
national regions in a sample of 91 aid-recipient countries. We have found that foreign
aid has a signicantly higher eect on nighttime light in the region in which the current
political leader was born than in other regions in countries with poor political institu-
tions, but not in countries with sound political institutions. These results both support
and qualify Peter Bauer's worries that foreign aid may lead to patronage and favoritism.
They suggest that foreign aid indeed tends to fuel favoritism, but that this tendency can
possibly be checked by sound political institutions that constrain political leaders and
hold them accountable.
We think our approach of combining nighttime light at the regional and local level
with data on the birth places of politicians opens a promising avenue for future research
on the political economy of regional development.
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26Appendix A: List of countries
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad,
Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of Congo, Costa
Rica, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, North Korea, South Korea, Laos, Liberia, Macedonia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myan-
mar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Appendix B: Description and Sources of Variables
See table 12.
Appendix C: Settlement areas
The settlement areas have been constructed using a shapele including the coordinates
of settlement points around the world provided by CSIESN (2005). These settlement
points are major cities but also small scale towns and villages. Even though it does not
include every human settlement, it is to our knowledge the most comprehensive collection
of settlement points publicly available. Around each of these points a circular shaped
buer area with a radius of 10 km has been constructed using ARC-GIS. An illustrative
example for India can be found in gure 5. We end up with 25,264 settlement buers with
an area of approx. 314 km2 for our sample. Using either the name or the coordinates of a
political leader's birthplace, we can identify the leader settlement area necessary for our
27estimates.
Figure 6 illustrates the procedure on the examples of Moi, the political leader of Kenya
from 1978-2002, and Kibaki who succeeded Moi in 2002. The small green dots represent
the settlement points and the yellow circular areas are the respective articial settlement
areas. Daniel Moi was born in Kurieng'wo, which is the black dot in the center of the more
north-western red circular area. This settlement area is dened as the leader settlement
area for the years 1992 until 2002. Mwai Kibaki was born in Gatuyaini, which is the
black dot in the center of the more south-eastern red circular area. This settlement area
is dened as the leader settlement area for Kenya from 2002 onwards. However, this
settlement area intersects with two other settlement areas, Kangema in the south and
Nyeri in the north. This problem occurs because the distance between these villages is
less than 20 km (2  10 km radius). Therefore, we label these two areas also as leader
settlement areas from 2002 onwards, as parts of their populated area lie in the buer of
the main leader settlement area.
28Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Lightict 304167 2:922 1:608  5:652 10:672
Leaderict 364742 0:004 0:063 0 1
Aidct 366370 (1428) 2.141 (3.412) 1.519 (1.438)  3:645 8:075
Polityct 357609 (1300) 0.707 (0.575) 0.279 (0.306) 0:050 1:000
Notes: Descriptive statistics for observations at the country level are in parentheses.
29Table 2: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Leaderict 1 0:030  0:014  0:010  0:008 0:011
(0:015) (0:029) (0:029) (0:065) (0:069)
Aidct 1  0:045  0:045  0:045  0:075  0:083
(0:014) (0:014) (0:014) (0:029) (0:030)
Polityct 1  0:005  0:005  0:003  0:086  0:179
(0:071) (0:071) (0:071) (0:099) (0:105)
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1 0:015 0:058 0:065 0:095
(0:010) (0:014) (0:022) (0:029)
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1  Polityct 1  0:065  0:071  0:110
(0:019) (0:032) (0:040)
Leaderict 1  Polityct 1  0:013  0:028
(0:085) (0:092)














Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.184
N 282596 282596 282596 282596 269061
Notes: Dependent variable is Lightict. Standard errors are adjusted for country-year clustering.
***, **, * indicate signicance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
30Table 3: Excluding World Regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Excluded observations EAP ECA LAC MENA SA SSA OPEC
Leaderict 1  0:066  0:001 0:041  0:023 0:023 0:024 0:008
(0:109) (0:069) (0:070) (0:077) (0:070) (0:082) (0:083)
Aidct 1  0:041  0:081  0:079  0:115  0:078  0:093  0:076
(0:039) (0:029) (0:030) (0:030) (0:030) (0:040) (0:029)
Polityct 1  0:159  0:188  0:187  0:281  0:188  0:078  0:109
(0:124) (0:105) (0:133) (0:109) (0:108) (0:122) (0:130)
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1 0:077 0:103 0:082 0:117 0:090 0:111 0:113
(0:036) (0:029) (0:030) (0:030) (0:029) (0:044) (0:029)
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1  Polityct 1  0:078  0:114  0:100  0:137  0:103  0:137  0:131
(0:044) (0:040) (0:054) (0:041) (0:040) (0:058) (0:040)
Interaction terms Zict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Xict Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.187 0.183 0.155 0.198 0.185 0.203 0.211
N 221715 261353 126172 236282 260103 239680 228850
Notes: Dependent variable is Lightict. Standard errors are adjusted for country-year clustering. ***, **, * indicate
signicance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
31Table 4: Alternative Samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample No LDCs Only LDCs Low ELF High ELF Leader changes Polity changes
Leaderict 1 0:053  0:561 0:053  0:102 0:028  0:106
(0:076) (0:254) (0:091) (0:118) (0:072) (0:094)
Aidct 1  0:104 0:022  0:092  0:120  0:103  0:110
(0:036) (0:078) (0:042) (0:045) (0:035) (0:039)
Polityct 1  0:212  0:539  0:297  0:201  0:203  0:216
(0:108) (0:486) (0:181) (0:127) (0:107) (0:115)
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1 0:110 0:198 0:094 0:112 0:093 0:118
(0:039) (0:063) (0:048) (0:039) (0:032) (0:035)
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1  Polityct 1  0:133  0:196  0:130  0:098  0:113  0:137
(0:052) (0:092) (0:066) (0:051) (0:044) (0:044)
Interaction terms Zict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Xict Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.189 0.138 0.211 0.156 0.189 0.178
N 257745 11316 196575 72486 254280 166328
Notes: Dependent variable is Lightict. Standard errors are adjusted for country-year clustering. ***, **, * indicate signicance at
the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
32Table 5: Alternatives Measures of Aid and Light
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leaderict 1  0:037 0:125 0:090 0:003
(0:077) (0:055) (0:063) (0:068)
Polityct 1  0:195  0:029  0:008  0:183






























Leaderict 1  Aidct 1 0:097
(0:029)
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1  Polityct 1  0:111
(0:040)
Interaction terms Zict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Xict Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.187 0.190 0.183 0.246
N 280832 277839 261017 272078
Notes: Dependent variable is Lightict in columns 1{3, and Lightarea
ict in column
4. In each column the interaction term with Polityct 1 in Zict 1 is based on the
particular aid variable used. Control variables in column 4 include the log of country
level population instead of regional population (Populationict). Standard errors are
adjusted for country-year clustering. ***, **, * indicate signicance at the 1, 5 and
10%-level, respectively.
33Table 6: Alternative Measures of Political Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Leaderict 1 0:006  0:027 0:012  0:036  0:099
(0:056) (0:049) (0:056) (0:062) (0:105)
Aidct 1  0:062  0:009  0:071  0:104  0:007
(0:024) (0:025) (0:024) (0:024) (0:031)
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1 0:073 0:061 0:069 0:093 0:104
(0:022) (0:024) (0:021) (0:025) (0:032)
Politydummyct 1  0:095
(0:071)
















Leaderict 1  Aidct 1  Governancect 1  0:222
(0:067)
Interaction terms Zict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Xict Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.185 0.191 0.186 0.187 0.187
N 271424 253226 271424 271424 270499
Notes: Dependent variable is Lightict. In each column the interactions terms in Zict 1 are based on
the particular institutional variable used. Standard errors are adjusted for country-year clustering. ***,
**, * indicate signicance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
34Table 7: Additional Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leaderict 1 0:074  0:088  0:216  0:067
(0:072) (0:082) (0:074) (0:068)
Aidct 1  0:084  0:094  0:092 0:004
(0:030) (0:041) (0:040) (0:037)
Polityct 1  0:181  0:269  0:197 0:084
(0:105) (0:124) (0:114) (0:141)
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1 0:077 0:113 0:151 0:088
(0:028) (0:033) (0:033) (0:029)
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1  Polityct 1  0:095  0:135  0:170  0:087
(0:039) (0:044) (0:046) (0:042)
Capitalic  Aidct 1 0:138 0:202 0:261 0:122
(0:039) (0:052) (0:051) (0:041)
Capitalic  Aidct 1  Polityct 1 0:027  0:059  0:110 0:041
(0:045) (0:056) (0:056) (0:046)
Capitalic  Polityct 1  0:323  0:055 0:088  0:408
(0:137) (0:156) (0:147) (0:127)
Expendituresct 0:110 0:090 0:105
(0:030) (0:028) (0:024)






Country-specic time trend No No No Yes
Interaction terms Zict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Xict Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.184 0.220 0.224 0.263
N 269061 231094 228572 228572
Notes: Dependent variable is Lightict. Standard errors are adjusted for country-year
clustering. ***, **, * indicate signicance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
35Table 8: Alternative Sources of Rents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Leaderict 1 0:364  0:175 0:385 0:144 0:026
(0:202) (0:260) (0:103) (0:141) (0:261)
Polityct 1 0:295  0:008 0:631 0:662 0:620
(0:251) (0:342) (0:137) (0:206) (0:333)
Aidct 1  0:114  0:042  0:047
(0:043) (0:034) (0:048)
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1 0:134 0:082 0:104
(0:035) (0:032) (0:039)
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1  Polityct 1  0:156  0:099  0:123
(0:047) (0:045) (0:052)
Expendituresct 1 0:145 0:150 0:071
(0:045) (0:047) (0:056)
Leaderict 1  Expendituresct 1  0:034 0:017 0:009
(0:045) (0:050) (0:055)
Leaderict 1  Expendituresct 1  Polityct 1 0:038  0:015 0:004
(0:057) (0:063) (0:066)
RRct 1 0:133 0:143 0:185
(0:029) (0:035) (0:047)
Leaderict 1  RRct 1  0:032  0:021  0:019
(0:025) (0:027) (0:036)
Leaderict 1  RRct 1  Polityct 1 0:037 0:025 0:022
(0:034) (0:038) (0:046)
Interaction terms Zict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Xict Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.194 0.194 0.186 0.185 0.195
N 276996 264055 273985 261010 256324
Notes: Dependent variable is Lightict. Interactions terms Zict 1 include Leaderict 1  Polityct 1 in
all columns; Expendituresct 1  Polityct 1 in columns 1, 2 and 5; Aidct 1  Polityct 1 in columns 2,
4 and 5; and RRct 1  Polityct 1 in columns 3, 4 and 5. Standard errors are adjusted for country-year
clustering. ***, **, * indicate signicance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
36Table 9: 2SLS estimates with instruments for foreign aid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leaderict 1  0:035  0:234  0:273  0:191
(0:088) (0:103) (0:097) (0:088)
Aidct 1  0:060  0:331  0:006  0:149
(0:048) (0:118) (0:063) (0:035)
Polityct 1  0:120  0:617  0:159  0:071
(0:064) (0:176) (0:098) (0:059)
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1 0:079 0:192 0:182 0:142
(0:029) (0:039) (0:038) (0:036)
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1  Polityct 1  0:110  0:253  0:226  0:178
(0:046) (0:057) (0:059) (0:055)
Capitalic  Aidct 1 0:482 0:437
(0:126) (0:119)
Capitalic  Aidct 1  Polityct 1  0:106 0:006
(0:085) (0:073)










Country-specic time trend No No No Yes
Interaction terms Zict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Xict No Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st stage F-statistics:
Aidct 1 1765.85 2742.95 3048.25 381.69
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1 372.64 343.80 228.90 232.72
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1  Polityct 1 307.04 294.74 154.57 161.26
Aidct 1  Polityct 1 10036.79 14699.41 14872.80 1728.22
Capitalic  Aidct 1 12.90 13.09
Capitalic  Aidct 1  Polityct 1 65.43 68.02
Underid. test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.156 0.169 0.218 0.259
N 282278 268801 228418 228418
Notes: Dependent variable is Lightict. In all columns we use 2SLS with AidHV
ct and its
interactions with Leaderict, Polityct and Leaderict  Polityct to instrument for Aidct
and its interactions with Leaderict, Polityct and Leaderict  Polityct. In columns 3 and
4 we further use the interactions of AidHV
ct with Capitalic and Capitalic  Polityct to
instrument for the interactions of Aidct with Capitalic and Capitalic  Polityct. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate signicance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level,
respectively.
37Table 10: Past and Future Leader Regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aidct 1  0:082  0:082  0:082  0:082  0:063  0:048
(0:029) (0:029) (0:029) (0:029) (0:030) (0:030)
Polityct 1  0:231  0:231  0:231  0:231  0:128  0:090
(0:096) (0:096) (0:096) (0:096) (0:107) (0:111)
Pastict 1 0:116
(0:094)
Pastict 1  Aidct 1  0:045
(0:045)






























ict 1  Aidct 1 0:039
(0:123)
Pastdeath






ict  Aidct 1 0:095
(0:051)
Future1






ict  Aidct 1 0:037
(0:058)
Future2
ict  Aidct 1  Polityct 1  0:080
(0:073)
Interaction terms Zict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Xict Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.197 0.217
N 251581 251581 251581 251581 249522 229343
Notes: Dependent variable is Lightict. In each column the interaction term with Polityct 1 in Zict 1 is
based on the particular past or future leader region variable used. Standard errors are adjusted for country-
year clustering. ***, **, * indicate signicance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
38Table 11: Settlement Areas
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leaderict 1  0:075  0:048  0:083  0:076
(0:040) (0:040) (0:046) (0:046)
Aidct 1  0:037  0:057  0:034  0:022
(0:028) (0:014) (0:014) (0:013)
Polityct 1  0:100  0:172  0:050  0:087
(0:078) (0:047) (0:047) (0:055)
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1 0:045 0:049 0:040 0:041
(0:014) (0:014) (0:015) (0:015)
Leaderict 1  Aidct 1  Polityct 1  0:057  0:055  0:052  0:049
(0:018) (0:017) (0:017) (0:018)
Capitalic  Aidct 1 0:060 0:064
(0:023) (0:022)
Capitalic  Aidct 1  Polityct 1  0:012  0:005
(0:026) (0:025)










Country-specic time trend No No No Yes
Interaction terms Zict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Xict No Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.307 0.328 0.363 0.379
N 308991 298494 257571 257571
Notes: Dependent variable is log of light per settlement area i. Leaderict is a dummy
that equals one if and only if settlement area i is the political leader's birthplace.
Capitalic is a dummy that equals one if and only if settlement area i is the capital
city of country c. Control variables Xict include the log of country level population
rather than population per settlement area. Standard errors are adjusted for country-
year clustering. ***, **, * indicate signicance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.
39Table 12: Variable description and sources
Variable Description Source
Lightict Log of nighttime light per capita (see text for details). NOAA (2009), CIESIN (2005)
Leaderict Dummy variable equal to 1 if region i is the birth region of Goemans et al. (2009); identication
the current political leader, and 0 otherwise. of leader's birthplace done by the
authors
Aidct Log of net overseas development assistance (ODA) disbursed OECD (2008)
in current USD per capita.
Polityct Revised Combined Polity Score (Polity2), normalized to 0-1. Marshall and Jaggers (2005)
Higher values indicate better political institutions.
Populationict Log of population at subnational level (in 1,000). Gridded Population of the World
dataset (GPW), CIESIN (2005)
Oilct Log of annual oil production (in barrel). U.S. EIA (2008)
Coalct Log annual coal production (in metric tons). U.S. EIA (2008)
Disastersct Number of natural disasters. EM-DAT, CRED(2008)
Revolutionsct Number of revolutions per year. Banks (2004)
Governancect ICRG indicator of Quality of Government. Higher values PRS Group (2007)
indicate higher quality of government.
Aidnn
ct Log of ODA per capita plus one, with negative values of Authors' calculation and OECD
ODA set to zero. (2008)
AidGDP
ct ODA as share of GDP. OECD (2008)
AidNAT
ct Log of Net Aid Transfers per capita. Roodman (2006)
Lightarea
ict Log of nighttime light per area (see text for details). NOAA (2009), CIESIN (2005)
Politydummyct Dummy variable equal to 1 if Polityct  0, and 0 otherwise. Authors' calculation
Checksct Number of veto players. Beck et al. (2001)
Rightsct Freedom House Political Rights Index, normalized to 0-1. http://www.freedomhouse.org
Higher values indicate more political rights.
Libertiesct Freedom House Civil Liberties Index, normalized to 0-1. http://www.freedomhouse.org
Higher values indicate more civil liberties.
Capitalic Dummy variable equal to 1 if the country's capital is located Authors' calculation
in region i, and 0 otherwise.
Expendituresct Log of government expenditures per capita. World Bank (2008)
Investmentct Investment as share of GDP. Penn World Table Version 6.3
Inflationct Average annual rate of CPI-based ination. Easterly (2005)
M2ct Ratio of M2/GDP. (nancial depth). Easterly (2005)
RRct Log of resource rents per capita. World Bank (2009)
AidHV
ct Log of constructed aid ows per capita (see text for details). Harding and Venables (2010)
Pastict Dummy variable equal to 1 if region i is not leader region Authors' calculation
in t, but in t   1, and 0 otherwise.
Past
regular
ict Dummy variable equal to 1 if Pastict = 1 and exit from Authors' calculation and
oce was regular. Goemans et al. (2009)
Past
irregular
ict Dummy variable equal to 1 if Pastict = 1 and exit from Authors' calculation and
oce was irregular. Goemans et al. (2009)
Pastdeath
ict Dummy variable equal to 1 if Pastict = 1 and leader died Authors' calculation and
of natural cause while in power. Goemans et al. (2009)
Future1
ict Dummy variable equal to 1 if region i is not leader region Authors' calculation
in t, but in t + 1, and 0 otherwise.
Future2
ict Dummy variable equal to 1 if region i is not leader region Authors' calculation










































































































































































Marginal effect of Leader*Aid on Light as Polity changes
44Figure 5: Nightime light intensity and settlement areas, India; 2003
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